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The Evolutionary Stability of CooperationSummary of: The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
Given a variety of strategies ranging from cooperative to combative, cooperative retaliatory strategies tend to be the most stable but remain vulnerable to invasion. DisciplinesKeywordsPublication Reference
Findings
Theorists have posited that pure tit-for-tat strategies in iterative prisoners dilemma games were invulnerable. Is this correct? The authors seek to answer this question by examining the ability of various prisoners dilemma gaming strategies to withstand invasion by other competing strategies. Bender and Swistak examine a gaming strategy universe that includes the strategies:
These strategies were examined in pure conditions where only one existed, and then competing strategies were introduced. If a given strategy could withstand incursions by competing strategies it was deemed "stable". Stability proved to be a continuum. All strategies proved to have points of equilibrium. At this point, a strategy can withstand its maximum level of incursion. That point is that strategy's maximum stability. |
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